Abstract. Recently the braid groups were introduced as a new source for cryptography. The group operations are performed efficiently and the features are quite different from those of other cryptographically popular groups. As the first step to put the braid groups into the area of pseudorandomness, this article presents some cryptographic primitives under two related assumptions in braid groups. First, assuming that the conjugacy problem is a one-way function, say f , we show which particular bit of the argument x is pseudorandom given f (x). Next, under the decision Ko-Lee assumption, we construct two provably secure pseudorandom schemes: a pseudorandom generator and a pseudorandom synthesizer.
Introduction
The notions of pseudorandomness and onewayness which are closely related are quite important in modern cryptography [8, 1, 17, 12] . These concepts are informally stated as: (i) A distribution is pseudorandom if no efficient algorithm can distinguish it from the uniform distribution [26] . (ii) A function is one-way if it is easy to evaluate but hard to invert [9] .
Recently, some mathematically hard problems in braid groups have been proposed as new candidates for cryptographic one-way functions [2, 19] . A braid group B n is an infinite non-commutative group naturally arising from geometric braids composed of n strands. One of the famous problems in braid groups is the conjugacy problem: Given (α, β) ∈ B n × B n , find (or determine whether there exists) χ ∈ B n such that β = χ −1 αχ. This problem was first introduced in the 1920s, and no polynomial-time algorithm is known for n ≥ 5. A variant of this problem was first applied to cryptography to build a key agreement scheme by Anshel et al. [2] .
Ko et al. [19] introduced another variant of this problem: Given α, χ −1
2 αχ 2 ∈ B n , where χ 1 and χ 2 are contained in some known subgroups of B n so that χ 1 χ 2 = χ 2 χ 1 , find χ −1 2 χ −1 1 αχ 1 χ 2 ∈ B n . For convenience, we call this problem the Ko-Lee problem. The Ko-Lee problem looks like the DiffieHellman problem in their structures, but it does not in their internal properties because of the different characteristics of the braid groups from finite commutative groups. For instance, a braid group is non-commutative and it has no finite subgroup except for the trivial subgroup. As the basis of the Ko-Lee problem,
The Ko-Lee Problem
As a basic pseudorandom primitive, a pseudorandom generator is informally defined to be an efficient algorithm expanding short random bit sequences into long pseudorandom bit sequences [26, 8] .
Naor et al. [23] first introduced the notion of pseudorandom synthesizer as a stronger one than pseudorandom generator in the following sense: While a pseudorandom generator, G, guarantees the pseudorandomness of {G(z i )} 1≤i≤n only when z 1 , . . . , z n are chosen uniformly and independently, a pseudorandom synthesizer, S, guarantees the pseudorandomness of {S(z i )} 1≤i≤n even when the z i 's are not completely independent. Loosely speaking, a pseudorandom synthesizer is a two variable function S(·, ·), so that if polynomially many random assignments are chosen to both variables, (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and (y 1 , . . . , y m ), then the output of S on all the combinations of these assignments, (S(x i , y j )) 1≤i,j≤m , is pseudorandom.
Our Result: From the KL-Assumption, we formally derive a decisional version mentioned to refer to the security of the braid public-key cryptosystem [19] . Under the decision Ko-Lee assumption (DKL-Assumption), we construct a pseudorandom generator and a pseudorandom synthesizer and show that they are provably secure.
The Conjugacy Problem
The Ko-Lee problem was originally proposed as a variant of the conjugacy problem to induce a trapdoor one-way function (for a public-key cryptosystem). However, it looks easier to solve than the conjugacy problem. Since pseudorandomness needs no trapdoor, the conjugacy problem itself can be considered.
If f is a one-way function, every bit of the argument x cannot be easily computed from f (x). A natural question is whether there is a specific bit of x which is not distinguished from a random bit by any efficient algorithm given f (x). This question was first addressed by Blum et al. [8] . Demonstrating such a pseudorandom bit for the discrete exponentiation function, they introduced the notion of hard-core predicate as a cryptographically useful tool. Loosely speaking, a hard-core predicate b of a function f is a polynomial-time computable boolean predicate such that b(x) is hard to predict from f (x). So far, two kinds of hard-core predicates have been proposed. On the one hand, for a few one-way function f 's, there has been discovered a particular bit of x, the so-called hardcore bit, which is the source of b(x) by the unique characteristic of f [8, 1] . For instance, Alexi et al. [1] showed that b(x) points to the least significant bit of x for the RSA and the Rabin functions. On the other hand, for any one-way function, one can make a hard-core predicate by Goldreich-Levin's construction [14] . More precisely, for any one-way function f , the inner-product mod 2 of x and r is a hard-core of g(x, r) def = (f (x), r). To distinguish these two kinds of hard-core predicates, we call the former kind the peculiar one and the latter kind the generic one.
Considering that among a number of known one-way functions only the RSA, the Rabin, and the discrete exponentiation functions have their peculiar hardcore predicates, it is interesting to find it for the conjugacy problem. It indicates which bit of the solution is equally difficult to compute as the entire solution.
The conjugacy problem in braid groups is quite different from those above one-way functions in the sense that it is not a group homomorphism. Since such a property is the basis for the construction of the previous peculiar hard-core predicates, we should take a completely different way to construct a peculiar hard-core for the conjugacy problem. Our Result: We first present a collection of one-way functions, cnj, under the intractability assumption of the (n, n−1)-GCP, which is almost the conjugacy problem from a computational complexity point of view. And we present two hard-core bits of cnj. Using one of them, we construct a peculiar hardcore predicate, inf, and prove that predicting inf(x) from cnj(x) is as hard as inverting cnj(x). Likewise the other hard-core bit.
Outline
In §2, we introduce some notations and briefly describe the braid groups. In §3, we examine the bit security in the conjugacy problem ( §3.1), present a collection of one-way functions based on that problem ( §3.2), and construct a hard-core predicate of the one-way function ( §3.3). In §4, we construct a pseudorandom generator ( §4.1) and a pseudorandom synthesizer ( §4.2).
Preliminaries

Notations
Basic notation: Let N and Z denote the set of all natural numbers and the set of all integers, respectively. For any bit-string x, ||x|| denotes its length (i.e. the number of bits in x). For a finite set S, |S| denotes the cardinality of S and ||S|| denotes the maximum among the bit-lengths of elements of S. The notation (a i,j ) 1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m denotes an (n × m)-matrix whose (i, j)-entry is a i,j .
Probability notation: The following notations are based on [16, 15, 3] .
A probability distribution D on a finite set S assigns a probability D(s) ≥ 0 to each s ∈ S, and thus s∈S D(s) = 1. For a distribution D, [D] denotes the support of D (the set of elements of positive probability). If a random variable x is distributed according to D on S, we write x D ← S, or simply x ← D if the set S is obvious from the context. The notation x 1 , . . . , x n ← D indicates that n random variables x 1 , . . . , x n are independently distributed according to D on S.
If f is a function mapping S to a set T , then f (x) : x ← D is a random variable that defines a distribution E, where for all t ∈ T , E(t) = s∈S,f (s)=t D(s).
If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input x, y, . . . the notation A(x, y, . . .) refers to the probability distribution induced by its internal random coin tosses. So if x ← D, y ← E, . . . are random variables, then A(x, y, . . .) : x ← D; y ← E; . . . represents the random variable distributed according to D, E, . . . and its internal random coin tosses.
We let x u ← S indicate that x is uniformly distributed on S; i.e., for all s ∈ S, Pr[x = s : x u ← S] = 1/|S|. For probability distributions D, E, . . ., the notation Pr[p(x, y, . . .) : x ← D; y ← E; · · · ] denotes the probability that the predicate p(x, y, . . .) is true after the (ordered) execution of the algorithms x ← D, y ← E, etc..
PPTA is short for "probabilistic polynomial time algorithm in its input length(s)".
The Braid Groups
In this section, we briefly review some basic material for braid groups. See [6, 10, 7] for details. For each integer n ≥ 2, the n-braid group B n is defined by the following group presentation
The integer n is called the braid index and each element of B n is called an nbraid. An n-braid has the following geometric interpretation: it is a set of disjoint n strands which run essentially to the same direction (our convention is vertical direction). The multiplication αβ of two braids α and β is the braid obtained by positioning α on the top of β, the identity e n is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands, and the inverse of α is the reflection of α with respect to a horizontal plane. Examples are given in Figure 1 
Fig. 1. An example of braids
Every braid χ ∈ B n has a unique decomposition called the left-canonical form, χ = ∆ u n χ 1 · · · χ k , where u ∈ Z and χ i 's are permutation braids except for e n and ∆ n such that F (χ i ) ⊃ S(χ i+1 ). In this article, all the braids are supposed to be in their left-canonical forms. Hence, for α, β ∈ B n , αβ means the left-canonical form of αβ and so it is hard to guess its original factor α or β from αβ.
For m < n, B m is regarded as the subgroup of B n generated only by σ 1 , . . . , σ m−1 of B n , and so
Due to [10, 7] , braid groups with all their operations-multiplication, inversion, converting into left-canonical forms-are efficiently handled by computers.
Hard-core Predicate
From the intractability assumption of the conjugacy problem, one can naturally derive a one-way function, cnj α : B n −→ B n , defined by cnj α (χ) = χ −1 αχ, where α ∈ B n .
Our goal in this section is to construct a peculiar hard-core predicate of cnj α . Therefore, we should discover for cnj α the hard-core bit of a braid into which the one-wayness of cnj α is transformed.
Notice that we are in different situation from previous ones for the following reasons: (i) A braid is not naturally expressed as a digit. (ii) cnj α is not a group homomorphism. By (i), we should find a different type of bit from the least significant bit (for RSA, Rabin) [1] or the most significant bit (for discrete exponentiation function) [8] . Since such a bit must be an invariant of a braid, let us consider the left-canonical form. Recall that any braid χ ∈ B n is uniquely expressed in its left-canonical form χ = ∆ u n χ 1 · · · χ p . Here, each of the integers u, p, and u + p is called the infimum, the canonical-length, and the supremum of χ and denoted by inf(χ), len(χ), and sup(χ), respectively. Because they are invariants of a braid, the hard-core bit may be derived from some of them. In contrast to (ii), the homomorphic property of the other one-way functions was essential to find their hard-core bits [8, 1] . Therefore, we should approach our problem in a new way.
Candidates for the Hard-core Bit
The following two propositions show the key properties of the infimum and the supremum to be the hard-core bits.
Proof. Note that for any χ 1 , χ 2 ∈ B n , inf(χ 1 χ 2 ) ≥ inf(χ 1 ) + inf(χ 2 ). Using this, we get inf(χ) − 1 ≤ inf(χσ
Thus it suffices to show that inf(χσ
n . This implies that ϕ = ϕ 2 σ i and so i ∈ F (ϕ).
From now on, we consider only the infimum. By Proposition 2, the supremum can be dealt with similarly to the infimum.
Proposition 1 shows a clue to finding a hard-core bit for the conjugacy problem in the following way: Loosely speaking, given (α, χ −1 αχ), if an adversary is allowed to access to an oracle IN F which on input (α, ζ −1 αζ) outputs inf(ζ) mod 2 for all ζ ∈ B n , then (s)he can detect the last generator of χ by comparing IN F(α, χ −1 αχ) with IN F(α, σ i χ −1 αχσ −1 i ). In the recursive way, (s)he finally obtains the entirety of χ.
The existence of IN F assumes that ζ −1
2 αζ 2 implies inf(ζ 1 ) = inf(ζ 2 ) mod 2. However, it does not always happen. For example, if α = ∆ n and ζ 2 = ∆ n ζ 1 , then ζ −1
2 αζ 2 but inf(ζ 2 ) = inf(ζ 1 ) + 1. Since α has a major influence on the complexity of the conjugacy problem, α cannot be arbitrarily chosen but must satisfy some property. Definition 1. We say that α ∈ B n is centralizer-free in B m if for any χ ∈ B m (m < n), χα = αχ implies χ = e m .
Note that if α is centralizer-free in B m , then ζ −1
Fact 1. Braids are classified into three dynamical types [20, 4] -periodic, reducible, pseudo-Anosov-by the Nielsen-Thurston classification of surface automorphisms [25, 24, 11, 5] . The periodic and the reducible types are of extremely special forms and the pseudo-Anosov one is of typical form [25] .
Fact 2. The pseudo-Anosov n-braids are centralizer-free in B n−1 (See [21] ).
It seems that if we choose at random an n-braid α with p canonical factors, then it is pseudo-Anosov with probability almost 1 −
α (β ) = e n−1 , and thus all of χ is reconstructed in χ .
if β = α, then go to step 3, else, go to step 2. 3. output χ .
Note that every n-permutation braid is composed of at most n(n−1) 2 generators of B n . So, the running time of the above algorithm is O(n 3 len(χ)T ), where T is the running time of IN F.
Construction of a Collection of One-way Functions, cnj
The original definition of one-way function refers to a single function operating on an infinite domain like f : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * . This formulation is suitable for an abstract discussion. However, for practical purposes, an infinite collection of functions each operating on a finite domain is more adequate. In this context, this section describes a collection of one-way functions under the intractability assumption of the conjugacy problem. Recall the formal definition of a collection of one-way functions.
Definition 2 ([13]
). Let I be an index set and for each i ∈ I let D i be a finite domain. A collection of one-way functions is a set F = {f i : D i −→ {0, 1} * } i∈I satisfying the following conditions: Cond 1. There exists a PPTA I which on input 1 n outputs i ∈ I ∩ {0, 1} n . Cond 2. There exists a PPTA D which on input i ∈ I outputs x ∈ D i . Cond 3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that on input (i, x) ∈ I × D i outputs f i (x). Cond 4. For every PPTA A, every polynomial P , and all sufficiently large n's,
Intuitively, the (n, m)-GCP becomes harder as m increases because B m is a subgroup of B n . As mentioned in §1, the (n, m)-GCP is a by-product of the KL-Assumption which is based on the (n, n 2 )-GCP [19] . However, one-way functions have no problem to be constructed from the conjugacy problem itself. To construct a hard-core predicate, from the discussion in §3.1 we consider the (n, n−1)-GCP which is almost the conjugacy problem in terms of computational complexity.
The hardness of the (n, n−1)-GCP depends on the braid index n, and the actual bound of the canonical-lengths of braids it takes. So it is natural and practical to take both the braid index and the canonical-length as its security parameter.
• ∀k = (n, p) ∈ I, let I k def = {α ∈ B + n − ∆ n B + n | len(α) = p} be an instance set. Let IG be a probabilistic algorithm that on input (1 n , 1 p ), where k = (n, p) ∈ I, outputs an element of I k .
• ∀k = (n, p) ∈ I, let D k def = [−p, p] n−1 . Let DG be a probabilistic algorithm that on input (1 n , 1 p ), where k = (n, p) ∈ I, outputs an element of D k .
• ∀k = (n, p) ∈ I, ∀α ∈ I k , define an instance function cnj α : D k −→ B n by cnj α (χ) = χ −1 αχ.
• ∀k = (n, p) ∈ I, let F k be the random variable defined on {cnj α } α∈I k distributed according to IG(1 n , 1 p ).
•
cnj clearly satisfies Cond 3 because given (α, χ) ∈ I n,p × D n,p , one can compute the left-canonical form of χ −1 αχ in time O(p 2 n log n) [10, 19] . Now we check Cond 1,2. Notice that to satisfy Cond 4, DG(1 n , 1 p ) cannot be mainly concentrated on polynomially many (in k) elements [13] .
The proof of Theorem 3 in [19] is followed by the next corollary.
Corollary 1.
There exists a PPTA whose outputs, on input (1 n , 1 p ), are distributed uniformly over a subset, S, of {χ ∈ B
Therefore, we can have IG and DG satisfy Cond 1,2,4 under the intractability assumption of the (n, n−1)-GCP. Furthermore, from this corollary and from the discussion of α in §3.1, cnj α can be regarded as 1 − 1 for all sufficiently large k = (n, p)'s in I and a randomly chosen α by IG(1 n , 1 p ). Hereafter, saying large k means large n and large p.
Construction of a Hard-core Predicate, inf
This section constructs a hard-core predicate of cnj. Recall the original definition of a hard-core predicate.
Definition 3 ([13]).
A polynomial-time computable predicate b : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} is called a hard-core of f : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} * if for every PPTA A, every positive polynomial P , and all sufficiently large n's in N
. Notice that, given (α, χ −1 αχ), to retrieve χ ∈ D n,p we must know inf(ζ) mod 2 from (α, ζ −1 αζ) for many ζ's in B n−1 which are closely related to χ. However, any finite subset of B n−1 except for {e n−1 } is not a group. So it happens that for some χ's in D n,p , some ζ's are not in D n,p . For this reason, the domain of hard-core predicate is defined slightly different from the corresponding one of cnj.
For every k = (n, p) ∈ I, consider a slightly enlarged set of D k ,
For every k = (n, p) ∈ I, define a PPTA DG(1 n , 1 p ) in the following order:
i . Using the infimum andD k , we now define a collection of boolean predicates
The following lemma is crucial to our main result. It shows, for a random choice χ ∈D k , how to turn a PPTA that predicts correctly inf k (χ) from cnj α (χ) with probability non-negligibly higher than 1/2 into a PPTA predicting almost correctly. Lemma 1. For an infinite subset F of I, let A be a PPTA and P be a positive polynomial such that for all
. Then for any positive polynomial Q, there exists a PPTA C such that for all
, and χ ∈ [DG(1 n , 1 p )], C executes the following algorithm:
be the i-th invoking of A for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
, output 1. Otherwise, output 0. For every k = (n, p) ∈ I and every i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, define a PPTA ζ
So {ζ
are independent and identically distributed random variables with common binomial distribution B (1, p) , where p ≤
and by applying Chebyshev's inequality, we get
Thus,
That is to say,
By this lemma and by the basic algorithm in Proposition 3, we get the following result: Theorem 1. inf is a hard-core predicate of cnj.
Proof. Assume that there exist a PPTA A, an infinite subset F of I, and a positive polynomial P such that for all k = (n, p) ∈ F
Fix k = (n, p) ∈ F . Using the basic algorithm in Proposition 3, on input
, M executes the following algorithm: 
Notice that hard-core predicates are used to construct pseudorandom generators in some cases by Blum-Micali's general method [8] . Loosely speaking, if l : N −→ N is a stretching function and f : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} n is a 1 − 1 one-way function with a hard-core b, then G(s)
) is a pseudorandom generator, where x 0 = s and x i = f (x i−1 ) for i = 1, . . . , l(n). This method does not apply to inf because cnj α (D k ) is much larger than D k . From the fact that most known one-way functions in braid groups (see [19] ) do not preserve their finite domains, hard-core predicates in braid groups seem to have no relation to this method.
Pseudorandom Schemes
The original KL-Assumption is as follows:
Given a triplet (α, χ −1 αχ, ψ −1 αψ) of elements in B n , where χ ∈ σ 1 , . . ., σ n 2 −1 and ψ ∈ σ n 2 +1 , . . . , σ n−1 , it is computationally infeasible to find ψ
Here, we defined m(n) as n 2 for notational convenience. Instead, it can take any number around this. From the definition of LD k and RD k , for every k = (n, p) ∈ I and every (χ, ψ)
Using these notations, the DKL-Assumption is stated as follows:
For every PPTA A, every positive polynomial P , and all sufficiently large k = (n, p)'s in I,
Actually, there is no known PPTA sampling χ from LD k uniformly at random. However, from Corollary 1, one can construct a PPTA LDG such that for every k = (n, p) ∈ I, LDG(1 Under this DKL-Assumption, this section constructs a pseudorandom generator and a pseudorandom synthesizer which are similar to those based on the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [22] . Since the securities are proved typically by the standard hybrid techniques [13, 16, 22, 23] , we only sketch them.
Pseudorandom Generator
Recall the formal definition of pseudorandom generator. The idea of this section is as follows: Given (α, χ −1 αχ) for α ∈ B n , χ ∈ B m , it looks hard to find χ even if we know (ψ = (h i,j ) 1≤i,j≤l to be h i,j = ψ Using these, the theorem can be proved by contradiction.
Concluding Remarks
This article has considered two related hard problems in braid groups: the conjugacy and the Ko-Lee problems, which are believed to be computationally infeasible in our current state of knowledge.
Assuming that the conjugacy problem is one-way, we have presented two peculiar hard-core predicates that are provably secure using the infimum and the supremum of a braid. This means that, given (α, χ −1 αχ), predicting the least significant bit of inf(χ) (or sup(χ)) is as hard as the entirety of χ.
Under the decision Ko-Lee assumption, we have proposed two practical pseudorandom schemes, a pseudorandom generator and a pseudorandom synthesizer, that are provably secure.
Braid groups are quite different from the other groups which have been dealt with so far. So the known methods to turn hard-core predicates into pseudorandom generators and to turn pseudorandom generators or pseudorandom synthesizers into pseudorandom function generators cannot be applied naively. Therefore, a natural line for further research is to study how to get these next cryptographic primitives from our results.
